SAM.gov (System for Award Management) Case Study

Prepared by: Safe Passage Strategies, LLC

Date: August 20, 2025

System Assessed: SAM.gov (System for Award Management)

Website: SAM.gov | Sign Terms of Use

Prepared by: Research & Analysis Team (advisory, non-law firm)

Background / Summary of System Access

SAM.gov (System for Award Management) is the U.S. government’s centralized registration platform for entities that wish to contract with, or receive grants from, federal agencies. In theory, it is designed to provide a single point of access for business registration, compliance checks, and procurement eligibility. In practice, SAM.gov functions less as a service platform and more as an enforcement and liability framework, where responsibility is shifted onto users while systemic safeguards remain undefined.

To properly evaluate SAM.gov’s approach to data governance and cybersecurity, it was not enough to review its terms at a distance. The only way to truly assess the system was to step into it: to create an account, register as a small business, and experience firsthand what the process demands. By putting myself and my company through the government’s official contracting gateway, I treated the experience as investigative research — uncovering not only the explicit rules, but the implicit values embedded in the system’s design.

This lived engagement exposed how the government’s contracting infrastructure prioritizes legal disclaimers over security guarantees, and how its outdated practices create structural risks for small businesses forced to participate. The flaws identified in the sections below are not theoretical; they were encountered directly in the course of registration.

The core lesson is simple: the best way to understand how deeply flawed government processes are is to experience them yourself. Only by moving through SAM.gov as a real registrant can one appreciate the gap between what the government claims to provide and what its systems actually deliver. That gap is not unique to me; if it is true for my experience, it is true for all individuals and businesses compelled to rely on this platform.

Annotated Flaw Log

Below is a line-by-line annotated flaw log of SAM.gov Terms of Use. Each clause is reproduced in summary form, followed by Safe Passage Strategies’ data governance and cybersecurity critique.

Section 1: Changing Site Data

Clause (excerpt): “Unauthorized attempts to upload or change information are strictly prohibited and may be punishable under federal law.”

Flaw Annotation:

• Focuses exclusively on user misconduct and legal punishment.

• No mention of system safeguards (e.g., intrusion detection, logging, access integrity).

• Governance Gap: Responsibility is framed as legal enforcement against users, not system-side assurance. This conflicts with ISO 27001 (A.12.4, A.12.6) which requires technical monitoring and preventive controls.

Section 2: Data Access

Clause (excerpt): “Do not use bots or scraping tools; update your API key and password every 90 days; do not share API keys.”

Flaw Annotation:

• Enforcement focuses on restricting automation, not providing governance clarity about system-wide access controls.

• Password and API key rotation every 90 days is outdated security guidance — modern frameworks favor risk-based multi-factor authentication and shorter session lifespans.

• Governance Gap: No description of API governance policies, audit trails, or scope-of-use restrictions. Inconsistent with NIST CSF PR.AC and ISO 27001 A.9 (access management).

Section 3: Sensitive Data (Most Glaring Finding)

Clause (excerpt): “Exposure of PII and/or CUI as a result of an individual inadvertently entering PII and/or CUI into a public data field where it is not required is the sole responsibility of the individual entering the data.”

Flaw Annotation:

• This is the most severe flaw in the Terms.

• Shifts all liability to the user, while SAM.gov refuses to commit to incident prevention, detection, or response.

• Implies that SAM.gov will not acknowledge accountability for safeguarding its own system.

• Governance Gap: Contradicts ISO 27001 A.16.1.5 (incident response), NIST CSF RS.CO (communications during incidents), and global best practices requiring shared responsibility.

• By disclaiming accountability, SAM.gov erodes trust and establishes a one-sided governance model where small businesses bear systemic risk.

Section 4: Privacy Policy

Clause (excerpt): “GSA uses Google Analytics to collect technical and behavioral information… Learn more about how Google Analytics safeguards data – opens in a new window. For more information on privacy and security, see our Privacy and Security Policy – opens in a new window.”

Flaw Annotation:

• The Terms disclose use of Google Analytics but provide no detail on safeguards, retention, or third-party data sharing.

• The hyperlink labeled “learn more about how Google Analytics safeguards data” redirects to a USA.gov cookie-blocking page that only explains what cookies are and how to block them.

• Misleading Reference: The page contains no information whatsoever about Google Analytics safeguards, despite the promise in the Terms.

• This creates an illusion of transparency while actually deflecting the user away from critical information about how data is processed, stored, or protected.

• Governance Gap:

  • Violates principles of clear disclosure under ISO 27701 (Privacy Information Management) and GDPR Articles 12–13, which require organizations to explain how third parties process personal data.

  • By failing to describe how Google Analytics handles federal user data, SAM.gov weakens accountability and undermines trust.

• Impact: Users are left without clarity about whether their data is anonymized, encrypted, shared, or retained, which is unacceptable under modern governance standards.

Additional Flaw Annotation:

• The Privacy and Security Policy link provided in the Terms redirects to a generic GSA Privacy Program page that mainly restates obligations under the 1974 Privacy Act and points to Systems of Records Notices (SORNs).

• The policy relies on outdated legal frameworks that do not align with modern standards such as ISO 27001, NIST CSF, or ISO 27701.

• Rather than disclosing actual safeguards, it keeps redirecting users into bureaucratic SORNs lists. These notices fragment accountability across dozens of GSA systems instead of defining centralized governance responsibilities.

• The Privacy Program makes no commitments about encryption, data minimization, breach notification, or lifecycle management. It offers only vague assurances about “access controls” while omitting user rights and system protections.

• Governance Gap: This approach represents opacity masquerading as compliance. Instead of clearly stating protections, the system hides behind legal references and record inventories.

• Impact: Businesses and individuals using SAM.gov are left with no meaningful understanding of how their data is secured or governed. Sensitive information such as Social Security Numbers, biometric identifiers, and financial data is referenced in SORNs but without system-wide commitments to protection.

Section 5: Restricted Data Use (Dun & Bradstreet)

Clause (excerpt): “D&B data is licensed; no warranties; no liability; may not be shared in bulk; cannot be used for commercial purposes.”

Flaw Annotation:

• Terms make D&B’s role clear but include sweeping disclaimers: “no liability,” “as-is,” “no warranty.”

• Introduces third-party vendor risk without accountability. SAM.gov absolves itself of governance duties by deferring to D&B’s limitations.

• Governance Gap: Violates principles of third-party risk management (NIST SP 800-161, ISO 27036). Users bear liability without guarantees of data quality, availability, or security.

Section 6: Non-Federal Administrator Roles

Clause (excerpt): “You may not assign administrator roles to individuals not directly tied to your entity; misuse must be reported.”

Flaw Annotation:

• This provision is reasonable in preventing fraudulent control of accounts.

• However, no mention is made of identity verification methods or how SAM.gov itself ensures administrator role integrity.

• Governance Gap: Terms push obligations on users but lack transparency on system validation controls. Misaligned with ISO 27001 A.9.2 (user registration and privilege management).

Section 7: Signing In

Clause (excerpt): “SAM.gov accounts are for individuals, not groups; do not share email addresses.”

Flaw Annotation:

• Reasonable principle but lacks reference to multi-factor authentication (MFA) or federated identity protections.

• Accounts tied to individual email addresses without clear technical safeguards present governance risk.

• Governance Gap: Missing alignment with NIST SP 800-63 (digital identity guidelines) and ISO 27001 A.9.4 (system and application access control).

Section 8: Vulnerability Disclosure Policy

Clause (excerpt):“This policy describes what systems and types of research are covered under this policy, how to send us vulnerability reports, and how long we ask security researchers to wait before publicly disclosing vulnerabilities.”

Flaw Annotation:

• Superficial Modernity: By referencing HackerOne and coordinated disclosure, GSA creates the impression of aligning with ISO 29147 (Vulnerability Disclosure) and NIST CSF DE.CM (security continuous monitoring).

• Narrow Scope: Only systems listed in the HackerOne “scope” page are covered. Anything not explicitly listed is excluded, even if it directly connects to SAM.gov. This leaves major blind spots in governance accountability.

• Overreliance on Legal Restrictions: The policy repeatedly warns researchers that anything “outside scope” or inconsistent with the policy may expose them to civil or criminal liability. This chilling effect discourages independent research, especially by small businesses or individual researchers, undermining the spirit of coordinated disclosure.

• Gaps in Secure Reporting: The policy instructs users not to send encrypted (PGP) emails — meaning researchers are forced to submit potentially sensitive vulnerability details through unencrypted channels (plain email or web form). This contradicts best practices for secure handling of vulnerability intelligence.

• Liability Shielding: Although the GSA commits not to initiate lawsuits if researchers comply, it explicitly warns that “other parties” (vendors, other agencies) may independently pursue action. This creates risk without protection for researchers acting in good faith.

• Governance Gap:

  • ISO 29147 emphasizes clear protections for researchers and transparent disclosure channels. SAM.gov undermines this by restricting scope, limiting protections, and threatening liability.

  • NIST CSF PR.IP-12 calls for vulnerability management processes aligned with risk. This policy outsources responsibility to researchers while disclaiming liability.

• Impact: The VDP projects accountability while actually limiting it. Instead of empowering a robust vulnerability ecosystem, the Terms deter independent review, centralize authority with GSA, and suppress external accountability.

Key Findings

1. Headline Flaw: SAM.gov shifts all liability for sensitive data exposure to users, implying that the system itself does not guarantee safeguards or incident response. This is a fundamental data governance failure.

2. Misleading Transparency: The Privacy Policy claims users can “learn how Google Analytics safeguards data,” but the link leads only to a cookie-blocking page, offering no governance assurances about Google’s processing of federal user data.

3. Hollow Privacy and Security Policy: The second link leads to a generic GSA Privacy Program page that relies on the 1974 Privacy Act and fragmented SORNs, offering no modern commitments to encryption, breach response, or lifecycle governance.

4. Lack of Shared Responsibility: Across all sections, obligations are pushed onto users while SAM.gov avoids committing to its own security and governance standards.

5. Vague and Outdated Security Practices: Reliance on password rotation and prohibitions against bots reflect outdated approaches rather than modern risk-based controls.

6. Third-Party Risk Blind Spots: Heavy disclaimers around D&B data leave users vulnerable without assurance of data quality or protection.

7. Absence of Lifecycle Governance: No commitments to data minimization, secure retention, or breach notification processes — all cornerstones of modern governance frameworks.

8. Vulnerability Disclosure Policy Gaps: While referencing HackerOne and coordinated disclosure suggests modern practices, the scope is narrowly defined, reporting channels lack encryption, and liability risks are shifted to researchers. Instead of empowering accountability, the policy deters independent review and shields GSA from responsibility.

   
   
   
   

Conclusion

The SAM.gov Terms of Use, Privacy references, and Vulnerability Disclosure Policy reveal a system that prioritizes institutional liability management over true data governance. Rather than adopting modern standards of transparency, accountability, and protection, SAM.gov repeatedly shifts responsibility to users, researchers, and third-party vendors. Links presented as transparency tools redirect to generic or irrelevant resources, leaving critical questions about data handling unanswered. Sensitive information such as Social Security Numbers, financial records, and biometric identifiers is referenced across fragmented SORNs without unified safeguards or lifecycle governance.

This pattern demonstrates that SAM.gov’s core concern is not the stewardship of data but the shielding of the agency from blame. Security commitments are vague, outdated, or narrowly scoped, while liability disclaimers are expansive. Vulnerability reporting mechanisms, instead of empowering accountability, discourage independent review and risk disclosure.

From a data governance perspective, this approach falls far short of international standards such as ISO 27001, ISO 27701, and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. For small businesses and individuals compelled to register in SAM.gov to participate in federal contracting, the result is structural exposure: mandatory compliance without guaranteed protection.

This case study underscores the need for a new paradigm of data governance that emphasizes shared responsibility, enforceable safeguards, and transparent accountability. As long as systems like SAM.gov remain anchored in outdated legal frameworks and bureaucratic self-protection, they will continue to lag behind the demands of the Fifth Industrial Revolution, where trust in data governance is not optional but essential.

Disclaimer

This document is an independent analytical review conducted by Safe Passage Strategies, LLC. It is intended for educational and informational purposes only, to highlight data governance and cybersecurity issues within contractual terms and conditions. Terms and conditions are deeply tied to governance and security, even though they are usually written as legal disclaimers rather than technical controls. They define who holds responsibility, what protections are promised, and what risks are shifted to the user. From a governance perspective, that is critical, because governance is not only about systems and controls but also about policies, accountability, and contracts that determine how data is handled. This report is not legal advice and should not be relied upon as a substitute for consultation with a licensed attorney. Safe Passage Strategies, LLC makes no claim as to the legal enforceability of the terms discussed.

While consultation with legal professionals is a conventional step, it must be acknowledged that the judicial system often functions as a self-perpetuating industry. Legal processes can prioritize procedural gamesmanship, political interests, and economic capture over logic, fairness, and reason. As such, even legal consultation may leave individuals and small businesses caught in systemic loops designed to absorb resources rather than deliver resolution. This underscores the broader need to transcend inherited legal-bureaucratic structures in the U.S. and design new systems of integrity, accountability, and sovereignty as we enter the Fifth Industrial Revolution (5IR).